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Opportunity and Equity:
Fixing Maine’s School Funding Formula
by Yellow Light Breen
In its last session, the legislature adopted much needed reforms to
Maine’s education funding formula. Among other things, these reforms
help to establish a link between education funding and student
performance, to recognize the true costs of education, and to better
measure the communities’ relative ability-to-pay. In succinct fashion,
Yellow Light Breen explains each of these elements to be phased in
over the next several years.  - He also responds to Peter Mills’
argument to eliminate income from the definition of ability-to-pay
and on the need for broader changes in how local government is
funded. He notes that the recently adopted reforms allow policymakers
the necessary breathing room to tackle these broader issues, but cautions
legislators to stay the course in completing the reforms they just enacted.
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Portions of this article were published earlier in Rural Connections
(Spring/Summer 1999), a quarterly newsletter of the Maine Rural
Development Council.
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, I arrived on the campus of fabled HarvardUniversity as a gangly, scared college freshman from the
small central Maine town of St. Albans. The move from one
of Maine’s poorest public school systems to the world’s
richest private college was dizzying, and I dived into the
academic and professional opportunities that had opened up
before me. But the stark contrast between the two worlds also
fueled two fierce and enduring passions: my abiding love for
my native state, and my deep commitment to basic equality in
educational opportunity. 
Fewer than half of my Harvard classmates had attended the
elite prep schools so entrenched in popular stereotype. But most
of the rest were products of public schools a world apart from
those I went to—public schools in affluent suburbs, with
campuses to rival many colleges, advanced placement courses in
every subject, virtually universal advancement to higher
education, and a dozen or more kids accepted to the Ivy League
every year. In contrast, my home School Administrative District
No. 48, centered in Newport, has long held a place of pride as
one of the lowest spending districts in the state. Computers were
scarce, labs were ancient, and only about a third of the graduates
would go on to a four-year degree program. 
Although perhaps less dramatic, the same gap in opportunity
exists today between public schools here in Maine—and so far this
decade the gap has been widening. The 20% of Maine’s schools
with the greatest wealth have on average over $900,000 worth of
taxable property valuation behind each student. The poorest 20%
have less than $170,000 of taxable property per student. Similarly,
the richest district in Maine has a median household income about
ten times greater than that in the poorest district.  
Maine’s school funding formula uses state subsidy to reduce
this opportunity gap, but it does not get the job done. Despite the
distribution of more than $600 million in state aid (General
Purpose Aid to Education, or “GPA”), many of Maine’s poorest,
mostly rural communities are levying high property tax rates,
and—despite receiving a high proportion of state subsidy—have
the least amount of money to spend on their students. Public
schools in Maine’s poorer communities often turn in impressive
performance results in core academic subjects, but simply cannot
support the breadth and depth of programs that their wealthier
counterparts offer.  
Although this inequality is frequently blamed on a funding
formula that is broken, the formula in fact has considerable
equalizing power. The most egregious and pressing inequities (and
the easiest to fix) are not a product of a broken funding formula,
but of an accounting practice that keeps a considerable fraction of
local education spending outside the formula altogether, and thus
excluded from the equalizing power of state assistance. This
accounting practice—a vestige of the recession of the early
1990s—forces poorer districts to raise disproportionately high tax
rates, or cut spending in that portion of the local budget which is
arbitrarily excluded from state assistance. 
This spring, the Maine Legislature took decisive action to
address the most pressing inequities in the school funding
formula. An uncommon but overwhelming consensus emerged
around a package of significant reforms to state education aid. As
Peter Mills argues in the accompanying article, larger questions
remain about the viability of Maine’s property taxation structure.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the GPA distribution
formula has been asked to bear more of the burden of producing
equity in property taxation than it can reasonably bear alone. But
if—and only if—the legislature can follow through on the
commitments made this year in fixing the formula, the worst
inequities will be moderated and there will be considerable
breathing room to broaden the debate.
EQUITY IN ACTION
This spring, the Maine Legislature adopted the unanimousrecommendations of its Education Committee to improve
equity in the school funding formula. In turn, the Education
Committee had endorsed the reform package proposed by the
Maine Department of Education. 
In developing suggestions for legislative action to improve
school funding, Commissioner Duke Albanese and the Department
of Education have sought to promote equal educational
opportunity for every child everywhere in Maine. This mission
includes three basic goals:
• Adequacy—that every student in Maine has the
support necessary to achieve the high academic
performance of the Learning Results; 
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• Pupil equity—that every student in Maine has the
same basic educational opportunity, wherever they
happen to attend school;
• Taxpayer equity—that every community in Maine is
able to provide that basic educational opportunity with
a similar tax effort relative to its ability to pay.
Maine’s school funding formula has tremendous equalizing
potential because it combines both aspects of equity. In concept,
the formula assumes that each school district will raise an equal
minimum tax effort for education, and then distributes state aid to
make up any differences so that the dollars available per student in
each district will be identical without exceeding the common tax
rate. In reality, the school funding mechanism that was in effect
prior to this year fell far short of these goals.
FOR RICHER, FOR POORER
This year, a consensus for reform began to coalesce—in part—because the Education Committee finally had available to it
clear and comprehensive comparative data on the distribution of
fiscal capacity and educational resources across Maine communities.
Discussion began to center on the characteristics and impacts of
school funding on the quintiles. The Department of Education
ranked Maine’s 286 school districts based on their ability to pay as
defined in the school funding formula (85% weight for property
valuation, 15% weight for median household income). The districts
were then grouped in five equal sets, or quintiles, from the
wealthiest 20% to the poorest 20%.
As the accompanying graphics illustrate, some characteristics
of these quintiles made an unavoidable case for change. The
property tax effort for education made by the poorest districts is
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typically among the highest of any communities, and yet that tax
effort—even with relatively high levels of state aid—produces the
least amount of resources behind each child [Figures 1-3]. The
poorest districts receive more than 70% of their education funds
from the state, and still spend roughly $1,500 less per student than
the wealthiest districts. This inequality simply could not be ignored. 
Second, the analysis of school districts grouped by wealth was
critical to demonstrate that more state funding alone, without
changes in distribution, would not in itself significantly improve
equity. Because nearly all communities can agree on the proposition
that more state funding is a good thing, often there is a focus on the
question of adequacy to the exclusion of equity. Last spring, the
news media focused heavily on a push by the education community
to raise the state’s share of total spending up to the 55% level
promised in 1984. The 55% target has assumed somewhat mythic
proportions, although the state’s share never reached higher than
51% even in the heady heydays of the late 1980s.  
The quintiles starkly illustrated that the push for additional
funds does not eliminate the need to distribute the available funds
by the fairest possible method. The funding formula in effect
prior to this year’s reforms did not ensure that additional funds
were targeted to the poorest, most needy school districts. For
example, if a $30 million additional appropriation had been
made this year with no changes, the new money would have
flowed out from the existing formula in such a way that it would
actually have widened the disparity between educational haves
and have-nots. It is true that significantly more astronomical
increases in state aid could make the debate over equity somewhat
academic—but the lesson of the 1980s and early 1990s is that
unless the increases are indefinitely sustainable, they can only
temporarily mask the underlying gap.
SOME EQUAL TREATMENT IS 
MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS 
If Maine’s school funding formula has tremendous equalizingpower, why is equity so elusive? It also seems incredible on its
face: poor school districts are receiving the lion’s share of state aid,
amounting to over 70% of their school budgets, and yet still
claiming the system is inequitable for them. As I stated at the outset,
the reason is that an accounting gimmick disproportionately shifts
property tax burden to poorer districts. 
During the early 1990s, an unstoppable obligation met an
immovable barrier. On the one hand, the state had committed itself
to paying a certain percentage of education costs (the actual
If Maine’s school funding formula has tremendous equalizing power,
why is equity so elusive?
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percentage bears only a vague relationship to the mythical 55%
“requirement”). On the other hand, there was no way the state
could distribute more funds than it had available in the cash crunch
of the time. The state had to reconcile an expenditure-driven
commitment with a revenue-driven reality. 
Aside from stopgap gimmicks, the answer settled upon was
straightforward, if a bit surreal. The state would arbitrarily exclude
part of local education costs from the funding formula. The portion
excluded was simply calculated so that the money available from
the state would satisfy the requisite percentage on the education
costs that were counted. So, for example, instead of 55% of
education costs, one-fifth of the costs would be excluded from the
formula, and the state would pay 55% of 80% of the costs. It was
lost on no one that the real state percentage would be 44%. 
On the surface, this reduction method was exceedingly fair.
Every school district in the state, rich and poor, would forgo the
same fraction of its theoretically expected state aid. Cape Elizabeth
and Calais would both receive 20% less subsidy than their
theoretical maximum. 
In reality, while the cuts were proportionately equal, the
impacts were vastly disparate. The cuts were a flat percentage and
thus did not account (as the funding formula did) for differences
in local ability-to-pay. First, the impact on school budgets was
not proportional: a poor school district receiving 80% of its
budget from state aid, when cut by 20%, would lose one-sixth of
its overall budget. A wealthier district receiving 20% of its
budget from state aid, when cut by 20%, would lose one-
twentieth of its overall budget. 
Second, and most importantly, when communities turned to
local tax assessment to try to complete their budget without state
aid, their ability to do so widely varied. A school district with an
extensive property tax base could make up the difference with
relatively small tweaks to the mill rate levied on property, and
maintain the level of funding desired. In contrast, a school district
with a minimal tax base could reach an average spending level only
with onerous increases in local mill rates [Figure 4]. 
The method for reconciling state aid with available state
revenues utterly ignored the potential consequences for taxpayer
equity. In practice, as the quintile analysis showed, the result was
that poorer districts raised local tax rates that were typically
equivalent to or somewhat higher than the average, and simply put
fewer resources behind their children. Rather than absorb grave
taxpayer inequity to attain equal spending, or sustain grave cuts in
spending to attain equal tax rates, poorer districts have tended to
live with meaningful disparities on both sides of the ledger. 
This interaction between taxpayer equity and pupil equity
illustrates one of the most difficult aspects of meaningful reform in
school funding. Real reform requires maintaining a simultaneous
focus on both pupil equity and taxpayer equity, and the interaction
between the two. Much of the apparent complexity in the public
policy debates over fairness in school funding springs from an
alarming tendency to focus on each of these three basic goals in
isolation. Tactically, one group of communities may focus on its
relative lack of resources (pupil equity) while ignoring its relatively
low tax effort (taxpayer equity). Another group of communities
may take credit for its robust local tax effort on behalf of education
(taxpayer equity) while ignoring the fact that this effort produces
vastly more resources than in poorer communities making an
equally strong local tax effort (pupil equity). This conceptual
divide-and-conquer enables virtually any demographic bloc to
make at least a superficial case as to why the state distribution
scheme ought to be more favorable to it. 
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THE EDUCATION REFORM PACKAGE
In this past legislative session, the Education Committeerecognized the need for action and unanimously
recommended an education reform package that, ultimately, was
adopted by the legislature. The elements of this package were
based on proposals put forward by the Department of
Education. Each element (described below) was considered
indispensable to achieving the Department’s three basic goals—
adequacy, pupil equity, and taxpayer equity.
Linking resources to student performance
We must be able to establish a link between resources
invested in education and the performance we want for students.
If more money is pumped into school subsidy, the amount of
money committed should be directly related to creating the
opportunities our children need. In the past, the need for funds
has been expenditure-driven, based on a percentage of
whatever happened to be spent in a prior year—or, as times got
tougher, revenue-driven, based on whatever the legislature has
been able to appropriate.
A new approach to school funding is required, based on what
our schools need to do the job of giving every child the resources
to succeed on Maine’s Learning Results. The Department of
Education has termed such an approach, Essential Programs and
Services. In part, it is based on measuring the resources that real,
high-performing Maine schools provide for children in faculty,
facilities, computers, activities, and so forth, and then calculating
the costs of providing those resources. 
The legislature’s education reform package is directly tied to
a longer-term transition to Essential Programs and Services.
Emphasis is placed on the amount of resources behind each
student—the per-pupil guarantee—which will be raised
gradually to create a foundation for the new approach. Over the
next several years, while changes are being made to improve
equity, additional data will be collected. Implementation will then
be accompanied by increasing GPA over several more years to
achieve the level of state funding needed.
Recognizing the true costs of education
Inequality persists primarily because the funding formula does
not recognize the true local costs of education. In a sense, the
funding formula is one of the biggest surviving budget gimmicks
of the recession of the early 1990s. The formula distributes
subsidy to equalize per-pupil spending and local tax effort, but only
counts a portion of total costs. Local costs “outside” the formula are
paid solely from local property taxes, and thus are a
disproportionate burden on poorer communities. Communities
with a low tax base are either unable to raise these needed funds,
or require a much higher tax effort to do so. 
As a solution to this problem, the per-pupil guarantee in the
school funding formula will be increased over several years to better
reflect true education costs. The legislature also endorsed the
Department of Education’s proposal to move toward full funding of
program costs (special education, vocational education,
transportation). These actions will eliminate the accounting gimmick
that keeps more than 20% of education spending unequalized. The
legislature’s plan achieves these targets over four years [Figures 5-6]. 
Declining student enrollments and subsidy, but fixed operating costs 
Many poor, rural districts and some cities are losing
population and large numbers of students, which results in a
significant drop in state subsidy (which is largely based on the
number of students) without corresponding decreases in the fixed
costs of operating schools. As old industries erode and people
move out—at precisely the moment when a community most
needs to develop new skills and talents to build a new future—the
schools begin bleeding state subsidy based on the number of
students in a district. To temper the effects of declining student
enrollments, the legislature’s plan averages pupil counts over
several years—rather than just the most recent year—allowing
schools a chance to adjust their fixed costs. 
Measuring ability to pay
If school subsidy will be distributed according to communities’
relative ability-to-pay, there remains considerable controversy about how
to measure ability-to-pay. Currently, the formula measures a community’s
We must be able to establish a link between resources invested 
in education and the performance we want for students.
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ability to pay based on two factors: the available tax base, as determined
by the amount of property value behind each student (85% weight), and
the income of the median household in the community (15% weight).
While some have argued against income because it hurts some rural
school districts, others have taken the view that income is plainly relevant
in concept: the tax is levied on property, but paid in most cases out of
our paychecks. Ability-to-pay encompasses not just the tax base, but the
resulting financial burden of levying against that tax base. Given two
towns with equal valuation and equal mill rates for property tax, the
town with the higher household incomes is going to feel less of a tax
“bite.” However, there is near-universal recognition that household
income and the associated cost-of-living (COLA) have proven to be very
difficult to measure and to compare. 
The legislature’s reform package preserves the value of income
as a component of ability-to-pay, but adopts the State Board of
Education’s recommendations to eliminate COLA and freeze
income at the 1998 level until more reliable data are available from
the 2000 Census. In addition, the State Board of Education was
directed to study whether there is a more appropriate mechanism
for incorporating income into the formula.
Distributing scarce resources
Any meaningful changes in the method of distribution under
the funding formula have the potential for significant shifts in state
subsidy, dividing the legislature and the education community
against itself in a struggle for scarce resources. To prevent the
debate from becoming a zero-sum game, the legislature adopted
the concept of a “Hold Harmless,” which prevents any school unit
from a loss of subsidy due to changes in the formula. The
legislature also added a second hardship cushion that guarantees no
school district will receive less than they received this year, even due
to demographic changes. The whole reform package is sustainable
with moderate increases in state aid over several years, and without
a radical reduction in subsidy for some school units. 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
The article in this issue by Peter Mills focuses heavily on hisargument to eliminate income from the definition of ability-to-
pay, and on the need for broader changes in state tax and local
Figure 5:
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subsidy policies to alleviate broader inequities in property taxation,
especially for service center communities. Without joining these
issues in full, the quintile analysis done by the Department
demonstrates definitively that bringing the school funding formula
more in line with actual education costs has a much greater positive
effect on equity than the elimination or modification of income
does. Moving to a formula that considers a community’s ability to
pay for real costs, without an accounting gimmick, is more
significant than tinkering with the components used to measure
ability-to-pay. 
With respect to service center communities, one of the
conclusions of the numerous data runs done this spring on a host
of proposed reforms is that it proved impossible to isolate changes
in the school funding formula that would have a consistently
positive impact on service center communities. Within the funding
formula, demographic differences seemed to outweigh the common
status as service center. It is notable, however, that retaining income
as an element of communities’ ability-to-pay was overwhelmingly
beneficial to the larger, more urban communities. This may be due
to a variety of reasons, including the greater prevalence of younger,
single-person households in cities. 
As tempting as it is to consider the need for other changes in
state subsidy and the property tax, it is important not to lose sight
of the work still needed to complete the reforms just enacted. As
significant as the legislature’s actions were this year, even more
critically important will be persevering to meet the targets over the
next three years of this far-sighted reform package. Action will be
required in each budget year to recognize the real costs of
education instead of arbitrarily excluding some portion. This
debate will be politically charged each time. Just as poorer districts
are penalized by having their poverty excluded from part of the
calculations, wealthier districts are benefitted by having their
wealth excluded from part of the calculations.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it’s not about money, it’s about opportunity. Against theodds, many Maine communities with the least resources available
are among the highest performing in terms of the achievement of
their students. One reason is that they have assets that count in
raising children that are not in any ledger. The future of education
funding, which we have labeled Essential Programs and Services,
pushes us to ask what are we buying in education, rather than simply
focusing on what we each have available to spend. 
Without high-quality educational opportunity for all
children—and not just our own—we risk making a myth out of
the basic American tenets of political democracy and economic free
markets. Both of these fundamental principles are a myth without
a meaningful commitment to a common core of knowledge and
skills, and a level playing field so that all citizens can participate and
compete based on their merits rather than on their pedigree. Free
public education is the most important ingredient of this
commitment. 
It will take much more than more state school funding
distributed more fairly to ensure that children everywhere in Maine
have equal opportunities to learn and to dream. But it’s a good
place to start. 
The author especially thanks Jim Watkins and Suzan Cameron of the
Department of Education for the data and graphics used in this article.
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